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RES IPSA LOQUITUR-AN ANALYSIS OF ITS
APPLICATION AND PROCEDURAL
EFFECTS IN NEBRASKA
I. INTRODUCTION
Of the numerous Latin phrases that have crept into the law,
the maxim res ipsa loquitur is perhaps the best known. Yet, this
innocuous phrase, which means nothing more than "the thing
speaks for itself," has been the source of much confusion and dis-
agreement. This divergence of opinion is centered around the
proper application and the procedural effect of the rules which
have been promulgated by the courts in giving effect to and in
applying this phrase. The purpose here is briefly to summarize the
different positions taken with respect to this doctrine, and then to
take a critical look at the application of res ipsa loquitur in Ne-
braska.
The history of the maxim is unique. It was first used in the
area of tort liability' by Barron Pollock during an argument with
counsel in the now famous case of Byrne v. Broadle.2 A barrel
of flour had rolled from a warehouse window striking a pedestrian,
and Pollock took the .position that this was one of those factual
situations in which it could be said, "res ipsa loquitur." From this
casual reference the doctrine has grown to its present state which,
as previously indicated, is one of disagreement and uncertainty.
This uncertainty, however, grows not out of the accepted require-
ments3 needed to raise the doctrine under a given set of facts, but
has developed with respect to the proper application and effect of
the rule. Before discussing these problems a brief statement of
the theory behind the rule seems proper.
Res ipsa loquitur is a type of circumstantial evidence that
may be used by a plaintiff to prove negligence on the part of an
I The phrase res ipsa loquitur has been used where usury was appar-
ent upon the face of an instrument, in connection with the revocation
of a license to use a way, and in misrepresentations in the sale of
goods. For cases cited to this effect see Prosser, The Procedural
Effect of Res Ispa Loquitur, 20 MixN. L. REv. 241 (1936).
2 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
3 See text at note 7 infra.
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alleged tortfeasor. 4 This circumstantial evidence is based upon
the peculiarities which may surround a given set of facts, and upon
common human knowledge and experience. 5 If the facts of an
accident are such as to bring the rule into application, the con-
clusion is drawn that the resulting injury was probably caused
by a breach of duty on the part of the defendant, and the question
of negligence is then submitted to the jury.6 Three requirements
are almost universally accepted as necessary prerequisites in order
for a plaintiff to avail himself of the doctrine.7 First, the accident
must be of a type that does not usually occur in the absence of
negligence; second, the instrumentality causing the injury must
be in the exclusive control of the defendant; and third, the plain-
tiff must not have been in any way responsible for the occurrence
of the accident. A fourth requirement often suggested is that
the evidence be more readily accessible to the defendant than to
the plaintiff.8 This fourth criterion, however, is not widely ac-
cepted as a prerequisite to the doctrine, and has been attacked by
some authoritiesY
Perhaps the most frequently quoted statement of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is that of Chief Justice Erle in Scott v. London
and St. Katherine Docks Co.:10
There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But where the
thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or
4 Benedict v. Eppley Hotel Co., 159 Neb. 23, 65 N.W.2d 224 (1954); Secu-
rity Ins. Co. v. Omaha Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 Neb. 923, 62 N.W.
2d 127 (1954); Watson Bros. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0.
Ry. 147 Neb. 880, 25 N.W.2d 396 (1947); Miratsky v. Breseda, 139 Neb.
229, 297 N.W. 94 (1941); PROSSER, TORTS 201 (2d ed. 1955); Carpenter,
The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 1 U. CHI. L. REv. 519 (1934).
5 PROSSER, TORTS 200 (2d ed. 1955).
6 Security Ins. Co. v. Omaha Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 Neb. 923, 62
N.W.2d 127 (1954).
7 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2509 (3d ed. 1940).
8 9 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2509 (3d ed. 1940). Though the Nebraska
court has never expressly stated accessibility of the evidence to the
defendant as being a requirement, the following language appearing
in Mischnick v. Iowa-Nebraska Light & Power Co., 125 Neb. 598, 602,
251 N.W. 258, 259 (1933) is subject to this interpretation: "The doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur proceeds on the theory that, under special circum-
stances which invoke its operation, the plaintiff is unable to specify
the particular act of negligence which caused the injury, but if the
petition alleges particular acts of negligence, the plaintiff, in order to
recover, must establish the specific negligence alleged, and the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be applied." (Emphasis added.)
9 Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REV.
241, 243 (1936).
10 3 H. & C. 596, 601, 159 Eng. Rep. 665, 667 (1865).
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his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by defendants, that the accident arose from want of
care.
The Nebraska position appears to be substantially the same. In
Miratsky v. Breseda it was said: 11
When the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown
to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have its management or control use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explana-
tion by defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
However, the mere occurrence of an accident will not provoke
application of the doctrine,' 2 and furthermore, the circumstantial
evidence derived from res ipsa loquitur must be evidence of the
negligence which was the proximate cause of the accident.13 This
former principle is merely a clarification of the generally accepted
requirements needed to invoke the doctrine, while the latter is
a statement of the law of proximate cause; that is, the negligence
of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the complained
injury.
II. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
The purpose here being, for the most part, an examination of
the Nebraska law, a proper starting point would seem to be a dis-
" 139 Neb. 229, 231, 297 N.W. 94, 95 (1941).
12 Sipprell v. Merner Motors, 164 Neb. 447, 82 N.W.2d 648 (1957); Pierce
v. Burlington Transp. Co., 139 Neb. 423, 297 N.W. 656 (1941); Thompson
v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 122 Neb. 843, 241 N.W. 565 (1932);
Broadston v. Beddeo Clothing Co., 104 Neb. 604, 178 N.W. 190 (1920).
Though the question has yet to be litigated in Nebraska, it has been
held prejudicial error in other jurisdictions to give a "mere happening
of an accident" instruction to the jury in a situation where res ipsa
loquitur applies as a matter of law. The reasoning behind these de-
cisions is that a "mere happening of an accident" instruction and a
res ipsa instruction appear as inconsistent ideas to the jury, and would
confuse them. Guerra v. Handlery Hotels, Inc., 53 Cal. 2d 266, 347
P.2d 674, 1 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1959); Brown v. George Pepperdine Founda-
tion, 23 Cal. 2d 256, 143 P.2d 929 (1943); Waller v. Ross, 100 Minn. 7,
110 N.W. 252 (1907); Olson v. Great Northern Ry., 68 Minn. 155, 71
N.W. 5 (1897) (instruction rightly denied that the mere happening
of an accident will not raise a presumption of negligence).
'3 Asher v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172 Neb. 855, 112 N.W.2d 252 (1961)
(evidence insufficient to establish intervention of third party); Mis-
chnick v. Iowa-Nebraska Light & Power Co., 125 Neb. 598, 251 N.W.
258 (1933) (no causal connection between fire and negligence charged);
PROSSER, TORTS 204 (2d ed. 1955).
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cussion of the applicability of res ipsa loquitur in this jurisdiction.
The reluctance of the court to apply the doctrine is evidenced by
a review of the Nebraska decisions. In one case 14 the court went
so far as to state that "the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is of limited
and restricted scope and should ordinarily be applied sparingly."
This attitude has resulted in what this writer believes to be, in
some instances, unsound and unjustifiable decisions. An examina-
tion of the Nebraska case law substantiates this view.
Kries v. Lang, 15 a 1928 decision, is demonstrative of the Ne-
braska attitude. Defendant was the owner of a three-story brick
building containing a bay window on the side adjacent to a public
sidewalk. A board which formed part of the window fell and
struck the plaintiff. The facts evidenced that the board was put
in place during the original construction of the building some thirty-
five years prior to the accident, and it was further shown that the
board was sound and undecayed. A "high wind," the velocity of
which was not stated, tore the board off the building. However,
the evidence indicated that the nails holding the board in place had
rusted to the extent of uselessness. The Nebraska Supreme Court
affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant, holding res ipsa
loquitur inapplicable. The basis for the decision is not altogether
clear from a reading of the opinion, but apparently the court felt
there had been no breach of the defendant's duty of care to persons
outside the premises. The court further stated that res ipsa should
not apply where evidence is adduced which is as consistent with
the absence as with the existence of negligence of the defendant;
that the rule is only applicable where the facts proved are more
consistent with negligence of the defendant than with the occur-
rence of a mere accident.
The decision appears unjustifiable. The factual situation is
almost identical to that in Byrne v. Broadle,16 the case from which
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur evolved. The court concluded that
since the rusted nails were not ascertainable by sight inspection
they were latent defects, and therefore, there was no breach of
duty of care; the defendant had to go no further than to use reason-
able care in keeping the building safe. This holding is difficult
to understand. The exercise of reasonable and prudent care in
keeping a building safe is unquestionably breached when a board
is permitted to be blown from the building to a public walk, and
14 Security Ins. Co. v. Omaha Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 Neb. 923, 929,
62 N.W.2d 127, 131 (1954).
15 116 Neb. 387, 217 N.W. 615 (1928).
16 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
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there is a showing of badly rusted nails. The least that can be
said for the situation is that a question of negligence is presented
for jury determination, yet a directed verdict for the defendant
was affirmed.
Another case somewhat disturbing is Security Ins. Co. v. Omaha
Coca-Cola Bottling Co.' 7  The insurance company issued a fire
insurance policy containing subrogation rights to the owner and
lessee of the building. The action was brought by the subrogee
on the ground of the defendant's negligence. A "coke" machine
was placed in the building by the defendant who promised to
keep it in proper working order. Subsequently the building was
damaged by smoke, the apparent cause being a fire in the vending
machine. There was no fire in the building itself, but the machine
was completely burned as were some adjacent bottle cases. The
plaintiff contended that the doctrine had application to the situa-
tion, and there was thus a question of negligence to be submitted
to the jury. The court took cognizance of the principle that al-
though a mere occurrence of a fire will not raise a "presumption
of negligence,"' 8 certain circumstances may justify an application
of the doctrine to an unexplained fire. The evidence showed that the
machine had rumbled and had been extremely noisy for several
days preceding the fire, and that the defendant had notice to this
effect. Yet, the court concluded that the facts did not establish a
case of res ipsa loquitur.
Looking at the requirements needed to establish a res ipsa
loquitur case, the factual situation in Security Ins. Co.19 appears
clearly to come within the ambit of these rules. Common experi-
ence should tell us that vending machines do not ordinarily burn
in the absence of negligence. Furthermore, the defendant had
notice that the machine had been unusually noisy, but had failed to
take any action in regard thereto. Although the defendants did
not have exclusive control of the machine, the Nebraska court has
held that exclusive control does not necessarily refer to actual
physical control at the time of the accident.20  Finally, the plain-
17 157 Neb. 923, 62 N.W.2d 127 (1954).
18 The word "presumption" as used by the court does not carry its usual
and accepted meaning, but refers to an inference of negligence which
is the procedural effect given res ipsa loquitur by the Nebraska court.
See note 60 infra.
19 157 Neb. 923, 62 N.W.2d 127 (1954).
20 Asher v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172 Neb. 855, 112 N.W.2d 252 (1961)
(Coca-Cola bottle containing a dead mouse was in possession of the
retailer immediately before sale to plaintiff); Benedict v. Eppley
Hotel Co., 159 Neb. 23, 65 N.W.2d 224 (1954) (court held the defendant
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tiff was in no way responsible for the fire, but did all that could
be expected of him by notification.
It should be pointed out, however, that as a general rule a
plaintiff suffering damages caused by a fire of unknown origin will
not be able to avail himself of res ipsa loquitur.21 Nevertheless,
as the Nebraska court noted, certain additional circumstances may
justify application of the doctrine. 22 The facts in the case under
discussion certainly appear to fall within this category. Yet, the
court, giving no apparent reason for its decision, concluded this
was not such an instance. The inevitable conclusion drawn from
the holding of this case, a review of the cases cited by the court as
authority for applying the doctrine, 23 and an examination of other
Nebraska cases involving a fire situation,24 is that res ipsa will
not be applied to an unexplained fire unless the situation is analo-
gous to that of an ignition caused by a passing locomotive.
was in exclusive control of a chair which collapsed even though at the
time of the accident the plaintiff had physical control). However,
the court has yet to depart from the concept of exclusive control to
the extent evidenced by the case of Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d
486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). In that case all the doctors and hospital
employees connected with an operation on the plaintiff were held
liable on a res ipsa theory for an unexplained traumatic shoulder
injury.
21 PROssER, TORTS 203 (2d ed. 1955).
22 Security Ins. Co. v. Omaha Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 Neb. 923, 929,
62 N.W.2d 127, 131 (1954). See Reurat v. Stevens, 113 Conn. 333, 155
Atl. 219 (1931), where res ipsa loquitur was applied to the unexplained
burning of a davenport when it was shown that the defendant was
the only person to smoke on the sofa all evening.
23 In Rogers v. Kansas City & 0. Ry., 52 Neb. 86, 71 N.W. 977 (1897), and
Burlington & Mo. R.R. v. Westover, 4 Neb. 268 (1876), the doctrine
was not referred to by name, but a rebuttable presumption of negli-
gence was permitted when a grass fire was started immediately after
the passing of a locomotive. Frederich v. Klise, 95 Neb. 244, 145 N.W.
353 (1914), involved fire damage to crops caused by the careless man-
agement of a traction engine. The court analogized this case to a
situation where a passing locomotive is the cause of a grass fire, and
concluded that the same rules were applicable to both situations.
24 Watenpaugh v. L. L. Coryell & Son, 135 Neb. 607, 283 N.W. 204 (1939)
(stove kindled with hot fire in room containing oily coats and jackets-
though the doctrine is not mentioned by name the court stated no
presumption of negligence was raised by the facts); Mischnick v.
Iowa-Nebraska Light & Power Co., 125 Neb. 598, 251 N.W. 258 (1933)
(fire allegedly caused by gas-pipe leak existing by reason of gas com-
pany's negligence-though the court held res ipsa inapplicable because
plaintiff pleaded specific acts of negligence, it is evident from a
reading of the opinion that the doctrine would not have been applied
notwithstanding the pleadings).
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Another case of interest is Buzzello v. Sramek.25  Here, de-
fendant left his automobile parked on a slope. He testified that
he pulled the emergency brake and set the wheels against the curb.
The car stood from ten to twenty minutes and then rolled down
the hill striking and killing the plaintiff's small child. It was
shown that some children were playing around the car, but there
was no evidence indicating they were meddling with the auto-
mobile. There was a further showing that the brakes were in good
condition. The plaintiff attempted to invoke the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, but the court held the doctrine inapplicable, feeling
the circumstances surrounding the accident were more consistent
with the view that it was caused by some unknown person rather
than by defendant's negligence. The interesting point about the
case is the language used by the court. In quoting from a New
York decision,2 the court stated: "The rule of res ipsa loquitur
cannot apply, where no negligence of defendant is shown by direct
evidence, and it is apparent that there may have been other causes
than defendant's negligence which led to the accident." 27  The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur proceeds, in part, on the theory that
negligence is inferred from a given set of facts because it may be
impossible for the plaintiff to show any negligence by direct evi-
dence, yet by this statement some negligence of the defendant
must be shown when it is possible an intervening agency could
have caused the accident. Such an attitude defeats the purpose of
the doctrine, especially in view of the Nebraska position that res
ipsa merely warrants an inference of negligence which the defend-
ant does not have to rebut and which the jury can accept or re-
ject.28 It does not compel 29 an inference of negligence nor does it
raise a presumption to that effect.30 The conjecture that a few
25 110 Neb. 262, 193 N.W. 743 (1923).
26 Keber v. Central Brewing Co., 150 N.Y. Supp. 986 (Sup. Ct. 1915) (a
truck rolled down hill, but here there was evidence that boys were
playing on the truck).
27 110 Neb. 262, 265, 193 N.W. 743, 744 (1923). (Emphasis added.)
28 Asher v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172 Neb. 855, 112 N.W.2d 252 (1961);
Benedict v. Eppley Hotel Co., 159 Neb. 23, 65 N.W.2d 224 (1954); Se-
curity Ins. Co. v. Omaha Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 Neb. 923, 62
N.W.2d 127 (1954); Watson Bros. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. &
0. Ry., 147 Neb. 880, 25 N.W.2d 396 (1947); Miratsky v. Breseda, 139
Neb. 229, 297 N.W. 94 (1941).
29 Security Ins. Co. v. Omaha Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 Neb. 923, 62
N.W.2d 127 (1954).
30 Benedict v. Eppley Hotel Co., 159 Neb. 23, 65 N.W.2d 224 (1954) (in-
struction that verdict must be for plaintiff if defendant fails to rebut
presumption was held to be erroneous).
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boys playing in the vicinity of an automobile which suddenly rolls
down a steep incline were the cause of this sudden starting is a
speculation that should be left to the jury, the fact-finders in our
legal system. The case involved an accident not usually happen-
ing without negligence on the part of someone; the defendant was
in control of the instrumentality; and the plaintiff was in no wise
at fault.
However, the court has not completely abrogated the doctrine.
A recent case, Asher v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,31 is perhaps in-
dicative of a change in attitude. The plaintiff, while drinking a
bottle of Coca-Cola, discovered a dead mouse in the bottle. Suit
was commenced against the defendant on two theories-res ipsa
loquitur and breach of implied warranty by the manufacturer. The
supreme court affirmed a lower court decision for the plaintiff,
holding either theory advanced by plaintiff as sufficient to sus-
tain the action. Defendant contended res ipsa could not apply
because there was divided control over the instrumentality causing
the harm, but this argument was rejected.32  The court further
rejected a claim that the mere possibility of someone tampering
with the bottles while they were in the possession of the retailer
negatived the theory of res ipsa loquitur. Perhaps this holding
somewhat dilutes the strong language found in the Buzzello case3 3
discussed above, but it is doubtful for the case was not cited and
the criticized language appearing therein remains to be impugned.
In other decisions the Nebraska court has applied the doctrine
where the plaintiff was sitting on a retaining wall and was struck
by the side of a turning streetcar;3 4 where a set of temporary
bleachers collapsed at a gymnastics exhibition;3 5 where the plain-
tiff's trucks were damaged when two boxcars became disengaged
from a switch engine;3 6 and where the plaintiff's chair collapsed
while she was participating in a bingo game.37 Also worthy of
31 172 Neb. 855, 112 N.W.2d 252 (1961).
32 The court felt that in order to satisfy the exclusive control requisite
of res ipsa loquitur, it must only be shown there was no tampering in
the interim between the physical control by the manufacturer and that
of the consumer. The jury found the mouse was in the bottle at
the time of delivery, and the court then concluded there was a reason-
able basis for this finding.
33 Buzzello v. Sramek, 110 Neb. 262, 193 N.W. 743 (1923).
34 Mercer v. Omaha & C. B. St. R.R., 108 Neb. 532, 188 N.W. 296 (1922).
35 Miratsky v. Breseda, 139 Neb. 229, 297 N.W. 94 (1941).
36 Watson Bros. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 147 Neb. 880,
25 N.W.2d 396 (1947).
37 Benedict v. Eppley Hotel Co., 161 Neb. 280, 73 N.W.2d 228 (1955).
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comment are a group of early Nebraska cases in which the court,
without mentioning the doctrine by name, held the facts to be
such as to warrant a rebuttable presumption of negligence. The
situations involved in these cases include a grass fire started
shortly after the passage of a locomotive;3 8 a streetcar running
off the track;39 and fire damage to crops after use of a traction
engine with a defective spark arrester.40 These early cases almost
invariably involved either common carriers or steam generated
engines run by fire, and thus the common law rules respecting
the higher duty of care owed seem to be more determinative with
respect to these holdings than the accepted requirements of res
ipsa loquitur. The language in these carrier cases, however, does
show the relationship between the inference of negligence which
may be raised against a common carrier and that which arises
through the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 41 It appears doubtful
that the decisions in these early cases are of much importance in
determining whether, under a given set of facts, a case of res
ipsa loquitur is presented. 42  For example, in Knight v. Lincoln
Traction Co.,43 the plaintiff, a passenger of defendant bus com-
pany, sustained injuries resulting from a collision between the
bus on which she was riding and an automobile, but the court
refused to apply the doctrine, stating: 44
[W]here a common carrier is operating a bus on a public street,
and is struck by an automobile, causing injuries to a passenger on
the bus, there is no presumption, from the mere fact of the colli-
sion, that the bus company was guilty of negligence.
38 Rogers v. Kansas City & 0. R.R., 52 Neb. 86, 71 N.W. 977 (1897); Bur-
lington & Mo. R.R. v. Westover, 4 Neb. 268 (1876).
39 Spellman v. Lincoln Rapid Transit Co., 36 Neb. 890, 55 N.W. 270 (1893).
40 Friederich v. Klise, 95 Neb. 244, 145 N.W. 353 (1914). The court
analogized this case to a situation where a passing locomotive is the
cause of a grass fire, and concluded that the same rules were appli-
cable in both situations.
41 In Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Howard, 45 Neb. 570, 63 N.W. 872 (1895),
it was stated that the "inference of negligence against a railroad
company must be a reasonable one, and where it is impossible to infer
negligence from established facts without reasoning irrationally and
contrary to common sense and experience of average men, there is
no question for the jury, and the court should direct a verdict for the
defendant."
42 Other than in a few of the early common carrier cases which men-
tioned res ipsa by name, such as Lincoln Traction Co. v. Webb, 73 Neb.
136, 102 N.W. 258 (1905), this group of decisions has yet to be cited
as authority for applying res ipsa loquitur.
43 127 Neb. 447, 255 N.W. 774 (1934).
44 Knight v. Lincoln Traction Co., 127 Neb. 447, 449, 255 N.W. 774, 775
(1934).
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This holding is contrary to the generally accepted rules applicable
to a collision involving a common carrier which causes injury to
a passenger. 45 Furthermore, the holding cannot be reconciled with
language appearing in Lincoln Traction Co. v. Shepard.4 6 In that
case the court refused to allow the plaintiff the benefit of the doc-
trine when she was injured while alighting from defendant's street-
car. The court pointed out the difference between this situation
and the case of a derailment or collision, and then concluded that
res ipsa loquitur would apply in the latter.
From the above it is apparent that application of the doctrine
has been very restricted. The only situations where the doctrine
is applied are those factual situations warranting almost a pre-
sumption of negligence, or where the direct evidence of negligence
is nearly sufficient in itself to establish liability.47 The court ap-
pears reluctant to give the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt by
submitting the case to the jury, thus enabling the fact-finders to
determine whether the inference raised by the doctrine is suffi-
cient to constitute a preponderance of the evidence when weighed
against any evidence the defendant might offer. In some cases,
as indicated, this amounts to a gross injustice.
III. THE PROCEDURAL EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE
The greatest area of confusion surrounding the application
of res ipsa loquitur pertains to the procedural effect to be given
the rule after the plaintiff has convinced the court of its applica-
bility.48 No less than three positions have been taken. The first,
and that followed by a majority of the courts, 4 9 is that once the
plaintiff has made out a case of res ipsa loquitur a permissible
45 See Capital Transit Co. v. Jackson, 149 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
46 74 Neb. 369, 104 N.W. 882 (1905), aff'd on rehearing, 74 Neb. 374, 107
N.W. 764 (1906).
47 Asher v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172 Neb. 855, 112 N.W.2d 252 (1961)
(dead mouse in a bottle of Coca-Cola); Benedict v. Eppley Hotel Co.,
161 Neb. 280, 73 N.W.2d 228 (1955) (folding chair collapsed, and it
was shown that braces on the sides had become loose); Watson Bros.
Transp. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 147 Neb. 880, 25 N.W.2d
396 (1947) (railroad cars broke loose from coupling because of a
bent pin-rod and pin-rod casting); Miratsky v. Breseda, 139 Neb. 229,
297 N.W. 94 (1941) (temporary bleachers collapsed).
48 For an interesting series of articles on this subject, see Carpenter, The
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 10 So. Cal. L. REv. 166
(1937); Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Reply to Professor Carpenter, 10
So. CAL. L. REV. 459 (1937); Carpenter, Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Rejoinder
to Professor Prosser, 10 So. CAL. L. REv. 467 (1937).
49 PROSSER, TORTS 211 (2d ed. 1955).
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inference of negligence arises.50 The question of negligence is
then submitted to the jury and it is allowed to determine whether
the circumstantial evidence adduced is sufficient to bring home
negligence to the defendant. The jury is permitted, but not com-
pelled, 51 to accept this circumstantial evidence. In this regard the
Nebraska court has said that res ipsa loquitur takes the place of
direct evidence as affecting the burden of proceeding with the
case.52  However, the burden of proof is not shifted,5 3 and the
defendant is not compelled to introduce evidence on his behalf.
Of course, failure to do so is likely to result in a verdict for the
plaintiff.
The second position adopted raises a rebuttable presumption
of negligence in favor of the plaintiff.54  Under this theory the
defendant is required to introduce evidence on his own behalf, the
absence of which will result in a directed verdict for the plaintiff.
However, the burden of proof still lies with the plaintiff and will
not be shifted.55
Under a third theory the establishment of a res ipsa case will
shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant. 6
This theory, in effect, requires the defendant to establish that he
was not negligent by a preponderance of the evidence, and is by
far the minority view.5 7
Nebraska appears to have adopted the position that res ipsa
loquitur warrants an inference of negligence, despite the fact that
50 Asher v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172 Neb. 855, 112 N.W.2d 252 (1961);
Benedict v. Eppley Hotel Co., 159 Neb. 23, 65 N.W.2d 224 (1954); Secur-
ity Ins. Co. v. Omaha Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 Neb. 923, 62 N.W.2d
127 (1954); Miratsky v. Breseda, 139 Neb. 229, 297 N.W. 94 (1941). For
cases in other jurisdictions see PROSSER, ToRTs 211 n.90 (2d ed. 1955).
51 Security Ins. Co. v. Omaha Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 Neb. 923, 62
N.W.2d 127 (1954).
52 Benedict v. Eppley Hotel Co., 161 Neb. 280, 73 N.W.2d 228 (1955).
53 Mercer v. Omaha & C. B. St. R.R., 108 Neb. 532, 188 N.W. 296 (1922);
Lincoln Traction Co. v. Webb, 73 Neb. 136, 102 N.W. 258 (1905).
54 PROSSER, ToRTs 212 (2d ed. 1955).
55 Schecter v. Hann, 305 Ky. 794, 205 S.W.2d 690 (1947); Kerner v. Charles
C. Tanner Co., 31 R.I. 203, 76 Atl. 833 (1910). Although Nebraska
does not follow the rebuttable presumption rule, this was the view
taken in Spellman v. Lincoln Rapid Transit Co., 36 Neb. 890, 55 N.W.
270 (1893).
56 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Mattice, 219 Ark. 428, 243 S.W.2d 15 (1951);
Jacks v. Reeves, 78 Ark. 426, 95 S.W. 781 (1906).
57 PROSSER, TORTS 212 (2d ed. 1955); Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res
Ipsa Loquitur, 20 linw. L. REV. 241, 244, 250 (1936).
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an examination of the case law reveals the use of language which
could be interpreted as meaning that, in a given fact situation, a
rebuttable presumption might be raised by the doctrine. For
example, the following statement found in Sipprell v. Merner
Motors5" might indicate that a presumption of negligence would
be raised if the doctrine was applicable: "The fact that an invitee
falls upon the steps leading from the exit of a building to the side-
walk below does not raise any presumption of negligence on the
part of its owner, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not
apply." In Asher v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.59 the court, while dis-
cussing the rule, stated: "The rule of res ipsa loquitur is a rule
of evidence. It is not conclusive and the inference or presump-
tion existing under the rule may be overcome by evidence." These
statements, when analyzed in a vacuum, are of little assistance in
determining the actual effect the court may give to the doctrine.6 0
Consequently, there appears to be no real uncertainty as to the
position taken by the Nebraska court."' In Security Ins. Co. v.
Omaha Coca-Cola Bottling Co.62 it was stated that the "doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence war-
rant the inference of negligence, not that they compel it." Fur-
thermore, in Benedict v. Eppley Hotel Co.3 3 the court held errone-
ous an instruction that if the defendant "fails to rebut the pre-
sumption or destroy the inference, then your verdict will be in
favor of the plaintiff." The court felt the jury was permitted to
understand that the defendant was obligated to explain how the
accident happened and to overcome by evidence any inference of
negligence. The attitude thus taken by the court strongly negates
any argument that res ipsa loquitur establishes a presumption of
negligence.
5s 164 Neb. 447, 455, 82 N.W.2d 648, 654 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
59 172 Neb. 855, 859, 112 N.W.2d 252, 255 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
60 The Nebraska court, like many others, has made casual use of the
words "presumption" and "inference," failing to distinguish between
the two terms. See, e.g., 25 IowA L. REV. 816 (1940). Therefore, an
examination of the specific language used will be useless in many
instances in determining the procedural effect of the doctrine. What
is necessary is an analysis of the cases themselves, rather than an an-
alysis of the court's phraseology.
61 This conclusion is contrary to the position taken in 33 NEB. L. REV. 620.
The author there suggests the procedural effect given depends upon
the evidentiary situations involved. However, except for the early
cases involving common carriers, the Nebraska court has consistently
adhered to the position that res ipsa loquitur means that the facts war-
rant an inference of negligence.
62 157 Neb. 923, 925, 62 N.W.2d 127, 129 (1954).
63 159 Neb. 23, 33, 65 N.W.2d 224, 231 (1954).
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In connection with the Nebraska rule on the procedural effect
of the doctrine, a group of cases concerning common carriers is
worthy of comment. In Lincoln Traction Co. v. Webb6 4 and Lin-
oln Traction Co. v. Shepard,65 each involving injury to a passen-
ger alighting from a streetcar, the court discussed the doctrine as
if it raised a presumption of negligence which must be rebutted
by the defendant. 6 6 The reason for the inconsistent positions can
be largely attributed to the involvement of a common carrier.
Because of the high duty of care owed to passengers, the happen-
ing of an accident may justify a presumption of negligence. 67 As
pointed out by one authority,68 res ipsa loquitur became involved
with the rules applicable to common carriers, and as a conse-
quence the procedural effects differ depending upon the defend-
ant involved.
It has been suggested that the procedural effect to be at-
tached to a given set of facts which establish a case of res ipsa
loquitur should depend, not upon any set rule, but upon the cir-
cumstances of each case.69 That is, one set of facts may justify an
inference of negligence, while another situation may be such as
to allow a rebuttable presumption. This position is well illus-
trated by the following example: 70
If a piece of mortar falls on the plaintiff from defendant's build-
ing it may be that negligence cannot be inferred; if a brick falls
from the same building, an inference may be permitted; but sup-
64 73 Neb. 136, 102 N.W. 258 (1905).
6G 74 Neb. 369, 104 N.W. 882 (1905), affd on rehearing, 74 Neb. 374, 107
N.W. 764 (1906).
66 In Lincoln Traction Co. v. Webb, 73 Neb. 136, 102 N.W. 258 (1905),
the court held erroneous an instruction which would have shifted the
burden of proof to the defendant. The court distinguished between
the burden of proof being shifted and a presumption being raised, and
concluded that res ipsa loquitur, when applicable, raised a presumption
of negligence. In Lincoln Traction Co. v. Shepard, 74 Neb. 369, 373,
104 N.W. 882, 883 (1905), aff'd on rehearing, 74 Neb. 374, 107 N.W. 764
(1906) the court stated: "Where negligence is proved, or where from
the nature of the accident ,Vhich was the proximate cause of the
injury negligence is presumed, the carrier is then required to show
it was no wise at fault."
67 Spellman v. Lincoln Rapid Transit Co., 36 Neb. 890, 55 N.W. 270 (1893).
But cf. Knight v. Lincoln Traction Co., 127 Neb. 447, 255 N.W. 774
(1934).
68 PROSSER, TORTS 213 (2d ed. 1955); Prosser, The Procedural Effect of
Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 ImN. L. REv. 241, 260 (1936).
69 Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REV.
241, 261 (1936).
70 Ibid.
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pose the falling object is an elephant? Could any reasonable
jury infer that those in charge had used due care?
This position is well taken, for res ipsa loquitur is a type of cir-
cumstantial evidence used to bring home negligence to the de-
fendant. Circumstantial evidence, like any other evidence, can be
strong or it can be weak, and when the evidence is so strong that,
in the absence of an explanation, no reasonable conclusion is pos-
sible but that the defendant was negligent, a rebuttable presump-
tion to that effect seems entirely justifiable. On the other hand
where this circumstantial evidence could lead to reasonable op-
posing conclusions as to the cause of the accident, only an infer-
ence of negligence should be drawn. This position, however, has
been adopted by only a few courts
1
.
7
IV. THE EFFECT OF PLEADING SPECIFIC
NEGLIGENCE
The courts have adopted four theories in considering the
effect of pleading specific allegations of negligence, while at the
same time relying on res ipsa loquitur to establish the negligence
of the defendant. Basically, these positions are: (1) the plain-
tiff has waived the right to rely on the doctrine;72 (2) the plain-
tiff may take advantage of the doctrine if the inference of negli-
gence supports the specific allegations; 3 (3) res ipsa loquitur is
available to the plaintiff provided the specific allegation is ac-
companied by a general allegation of negligence;1 4 and (4) the
doctrine is available without regard to the form of the pleading.75
71 Kleinman v. Banner Laundry Co., 150 Minn. 515, 186 N.W. 123 (1921);
Keithley v. Hettinger, 133 Minn. 36, 157 N.W. 897 (1916); Angerman Co.
v. Edge, 76 Utah 394, 290 Pac. 169 (1930).
72 Roos v. Consumers Pub. Power Dist., 171 Neb. 563, 106 N.W.2d 871
(1961); Weston v. Gold & Co., 167 Neb. 692, 94 N.W.2d 380 (1959);
Mischnick v. Iowa-Nebraska Light & Power Co., 125 Neb. 598, 251
N.W. 258 (1933).
73 Pickwick Stages Corp. v. Messinger, 44 Ariz. 174, 36 P.2d 168 (1934);
Palmer Brick Co. v. Chenall, 119 Ga. 837, 47 S.E. 329 (1904); Short
v. D. R. B. Logging Co., 192 Ore. 383, 235 P.2d 340 (1951).
74 Leet v. Union Pac. R.R., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 155 P.2d 42 (1944); Colorado
Spring & Interurban Ry. v. Reese, 69 Colo. 1, 169 Pac. 572 (1917); Krue-
ger v. Richardson, 326 Ill. App. 205, 61 N.E.2d 399 (1945); Independent
E. Torpedo Co. v. Gage, 206 Okla. 108, 240 P.2d 1119 (1951); Loos v.
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 99 Utah 496, 108 P.2d 254 (1940); D'Amico
v. Conguista, 24 Wash. 2d 674, 167 P.2d 157 (1946); Weggeman v.
Seven-Up Bottling Co., 5 Wis. 2d 503, 93 N.W.2d 467(1958), rehearing
denied, mandate amended, 5 Wis. 2d 503, 94 N.W.2d 645 (1959).
75 Briganti v. Connecticut Co., 119 Conn. 316, 175 Atl. 679 (1934); Nash-
ville Interurban Ry. v. Gregory, 137 Tenn. 422, 193 S.W. 1053 (1917).
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The Nebraska court has chosen to adhere to the first view,76
namely, that by pleading specific acts of negligence as a cause of
action the plaintiff may not at the same time rely on res ipsa
loquitur. This view, as will be shown by an examination of the
cases, lends itself to unjust results in many situations. In Weston
v. Gold & Co., 77 for example, a five year-old boy lost his toe when
it became lodged between a step and the side panel of an escala-
tor. The plaintiff alleged specific acts of negligence on the part
of the defendant and at the same time relied on the doctrine. The
trial court was held to be in error in submitting the case to the
jury under a res ipsa theory. It was said: 78
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur proceeds on the theory that,
under special circumstances which invoke its operation, the plain-
tiff is unable to specify the particular act of negligence which
caused the injury, but if the petition alleges particular acts of
negligence, then the plaintiff, in order to recover, must establish
the specific negligence alleged, bnd the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
cannot be applied.
In other words, the court held that when the plaintiff indicates
apparent knowledge as to the cause of the accident, he cannot use
the inference of negligence arising from the doctrine to help es-
tablish these facts. The basic fallacy in this position is an as-
sumption that res ipsa loquitur is an alternative method of estab-
lishing negligence rather than what it actually is, a type of cir-
cumstantial evidence. 79
However, the court has announced that a plaintiff's right to
rely on the doctrine will not be prejudiced by the introduction of
negligent acts on the part of the defendant which do not clearly
establish the facts or which leave the matter doubtful.8 0 The lan-
guage used is very unclear, and it is extremely doubtful the court
meant to imply that a plaintiff may allege negligence generally
and rely on the doctrine, while at the same time introducing into
evidence the specific acts of negligence which caused the injury.8 '
76 See cases cited note 73 supra.
77 167 Neb. 692, 94 N.W.2d 380 (1959).
78 Weston v. Gold & Co., 167 Neb. 692, 699, 94 N.W.2d 380, 385 (1959).
79 See authorities cited note 4 supra.
80 Security Ins. Co. v. Omaha Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 Neb. 923, 62
N.W.2d 127 (1954).
81 This conclusion is drawn from the reasoning given by the court for not
allowing specific allegations of negligence. The theory is that the
plaintiff should be unable to specify particular acts of negligence if
the doctrine is applicable. See note 8 supra. Applying this same reason-
ing to an attempt to introduce into evidence the specific acts causing
the injury, the logical result is that the doctrine cannot be invoked.
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Apparently the court is merely stating that a plaintiff may rely
on the doctrine to prove up the specific negligent acts causing the
injury, and at the same time show collateral acts of negligence
on the part of the defendant. That is, negligence of the defend-
ant can be introduced into evidence, but it cannot be such as to
show the exact cause of the injury to the plaintiff. Consequently,
a plaintiff wishing to rely on res ipsa loquitur can neither allege
specific acts of negligence nor can he introduce into evidence any
fact tending to establish the exact cause of the accident.
The undesirability of applying this waiver theory is demon-
strated by the resulting dilemma in which the plaintiff's attorney
finds himself when confronted with an election of alternatives by
which to establish the defendant's negligence. On the one hand
he has knowledge of the Nebraska court's reluctance to hold res
ipsa loquitur applicable under a given set of facts, while on the
other hand he may not believe his knowledge of the facts suffi-
cient to establish negligence by direct evidence. This dilemma is
not only perplexing to the attorney, but it is unjust to his injured
client. A party has been injured; the circumstances are indica-
tive of negligence; the facts may show some direct evidence of
defendant's negligence; yet recovery may be disallowed because
of the pleadings used.
A further point which merits discussion is the incongruity be-
tween the Nebraska rule of pleading specific acts of negligence
and the procedural effect of the doctrine in this state. As previ-
ously indicated, Nebraska follows the rule that res ipsa loquitur
warrants an inference of negligence rather than that it raises a
rebuttable presumption. The defendant is not required to intro-
duce the slightest bit of evidence in order to succeed, for the jury
can accept or reject this inference as satisfying the necessary
quantum of proof. It will be remembered, on the other hand,
that the presumption theory requires the defendant to produce
sufficient evidence to rebut the plaintiff's case. Thus under this
latter theory the establishment of a res ipsa case gives the plain-
tiff a definite procedural advantage, while under the inference
theory such an advantage is not given. The point is then, why
give the defendant an added advantage by putting the plaintiff
to what amounts to an almost impossible election? When a court
adopts the presumption theory, the waiver rule of specific plead-
ings might possibly be justified. However, to this writer, a sound
analysis of res ipsa indicates that the Nebraska position of waiver
has no merit regardless of the procedural effect given to the doc-
trine. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of circumstantial evidence used
to bring home negligence to an individual defendant when the
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three requirements of the rule are met. Allegations of specific
acts of negligence, provided those acts are consistent with the
negligence to be inferred, are in no manner inconsistent with the
doctrine. If anything, the allegation and establishment of specific
acts would tend to strengthen the inference of negligence that
may be drawn from the facts.
One final point should be mentioned. In Asher v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. 82 the Nebraska court held that an action based on
two theories, res ipsa loquitur and breach of warranty, could be
maintained, and that the principle of election was not applicable.
The court stated that neither remedy was inconsistent with the
other because only one wrong was alleged. If this is the case,
why is a plaintiff denied the right to plead both res ipsa loquitur
and specific acts of negligence? Neither theory is inconsistent
with the other, but they are, in reality, one and the same. Each
is used to bring home the negligence of the defendant-one by
circumstantial evidence, the other by direct evidence. It is rec-
ognized that the holding in the Asher case and the position now
advocated have basic differences, 3 the point now made being the
unreasonableness and unsound basis of the Nebraska rule which
precludes reliance on res ipsa if specific acts of negligence are
alleged.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose here has been to present a critical analysis of
the positions adopted by the Nebraska court with respect to the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Basically, there appears to be a
two-fold problem. First, the court has been reluctant to apply
the rule, thus causing much uncertainty as to what factual situa-
tions will bring the doctrine into effect. In view of the fact that
res ipsa loquitur is merely evidence of negligence to be weighed
by the jury, this restrictive view seems to be unsound and unjust.
A strict application may be perfectly justifiable if res ipsa loqui-
tur is held to a rebuttable presumption of negligence, but this is
not the Nebraska rule. Therefore what is now advocated is a
more liberal application of the rule in conformity with the three
generally accepted requirements necessary to bring the doctrine
into operation.
82 172 Neb. 855, 112 N.W.2d 252 (1961).
83 In the Asher case, the theories advanced by the plaintiff were two
different causes-breach of warranty and negligence. Allowing
a plaintiff to plead specific acts of negligence and rely on res ipsa
loquitur is merely allowing two methods of establishing the same cause
of action-negligence.
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A further change is also suggested. The Nebraska position
with regard to pleading specific acts of negligence is inconsistent
with a conventional analysis of the doctrine. Res ipsa loquitur is
not an alternative method by which tort liability is imposed upon
a defendant. It is a type of circumstantial evidence used to show
the negligence that was the proximate cause of injury to the
plaintiff. Consequently there appears to be no sound reason for
denying a plaintiff the use of the doctrine when specific acts of
negligence are pleaded.
Fredric H. Kauffman, '64
